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CHAPTER ONE

THE PROSPECT FOR A*
NATIONAL STEEL STRIKE
.
.~
7
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1919, after the steel trust, by the use of troop6 .
,gunmen, scabs, lying newspapers and mass starvation, had violently broken the strike of 365,000
steel workers and lashed these oppressed toilers back
into the mills, I ventured to forecast in my book, The
Greag Steel Strike Ivnd Its Lessons, that "it will, not be
long until they have another big movement under way.
. . .The great steel strike of 1919 will seem only a preliminary skirmish when compared with the tremendous
battles that are bound to come."
This forecast is now in all probability about to be realized. Events are fast shaping up for the greatest
labor struggIe in American history, one that will involve unparalleled masses of striking workers, and
probably several industries, in the very heart of the
industrial system, with the steel industry as the storm
center of the whole movement. Already the beginnings
of this huge struggle are to be seen, as I write this, in
the upheavals among the automobile workers.
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The Long Struggle of the Steel Workers

Ever since the decisive defeat of trade unionism in
the steel industry during the great Homestead strike
44 years ago, the steel trust has ruthlessly lorded it
3
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over the vast army of steel slaves. The steel
have enfomed upon the workers the most ruthless exloitation, with low wages, the long day and
ek, infamous spy -systems, boss tyranny in the
lesale slaughter by unprotected machinery, etc., etc
y have made of the steel towns dirty, miserable
poverty-stricken, disease-laden shack communities rule
by gunmen and servile company political tools and
devoid of all culture and beauty. And the national and
state governments have actively assisted in maintaining
this outrageous situation.
The steel workers have waged many fierce and determined struggles to end their intolerable position: the
heroic Homestead strike of the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers (A.A.) in 1892,
the hard-fought battles of the A.A. in 190 1 and 1909,
the brave struggles of the I.W.W. in McKees Rocks in
1909, the huge national strike of the 24 allied A. F. of L.
unions in 1919, the bitter strike of the Steel and Metal
Workers Industrial Union (T.U.U.L.) in ~ m b r i d ~ e
in 1933, the general organization campaign of the A.A
in 1934 and many other big movements throughout
the years. During these heroic struggles for liberty,
company thugs have jailed and murdered many steel
workers and union organizers, and their martyrdom is
symbolized by the asassination of the able and courageous organizer, Fanny Sellins, who was shot to death
by steel trust gunmen in 19 19.
All these courageous battles of the steel workers were
lost, that is, lost in the sense that they failed to achieve
their major goal of unionizing the &dustry. Some of

them, it is true, brought a measure of relief ta .the steel
workers, such as the great 1919 strike which iholihed
the 12-hour day and seven-day week and ~ ~ i
generally improved conditions. All of them
the
iron of class bitterness deep into the steel wo-'
hearts, but gone of them resulte'd-inestablishing a sdtlid
organization in the steel industry.
The ever-present enemy combination of the powerful steel trust and the hostile capitalist government,
aided by the maneuvers of dishonest A. F. of L. labor
leaders, was always too much for the steel workers. But
now the steel workers, with better leadership and organization, are mobilizing their forces for a new struggle, for a fresh attempt to secure relief from the outrageous tyranny and exploitation in their industry. The
Committee for Industrial Organization, comprising 15
unions with a total of some 1,500,000 members and
headed by John L. Lewis, the aggressive president of
the United Mine Workers of America, is going ahead
with determination to organize the half million workers
in the great steel industry. The field leader of the work
is Phillip Murray, chief of the Sfeel Workers Organizing Committee (S.W.O.C.) and vice-president of the
U.M.W.A.
--I\

A Favorable Outlook

Many factors combine to make the present sirnation
very favorable for the success of the C.I.O. campaign.
First, the steel workers, like the great body of American workers generally, are in a highly militant mood
and are determined to force concessions from their em-,
ployers. They are especially strengthened in their new
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morale by the defeat of Landon in the 1936 elections,
and they feel a new.sense of confidence and power.
Second, conditions in the industry are on the up'-grade from an economic standpoint and are favorable
for a drive. to organization. Besides, the steel bosses
ate somewhat on the dkfensive after their big election
defeat.
Third, the Roosevelt government is deeply obligated
to labor and even if it will take no active steps to organize the steel workers, it will probably not definitely oppose it, as so many adminiitrations have strenuously
done in the past.
Fourth, another favorable factor is that for the first
time a substantial section of organized labor, the C.I.O.,
realizes the vital importance of organizing steel and is
pushing forward energetically toward its accomplishment. The drive also has the support of the Communist
Party, and other militant and progressive forces.
Fifth, the organization drive is proceeding on the advantageous basis of uniting all the steel workers into one
industrial union, the A.A., instead of into a couple of
dozen disunited, squabbling craft unions as in previous
campaigns.
A Huge Stdm in the Making
'
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The drive of the steel workers for trade union organization will almost certainly result in a big strike, probably the greatest this country has' ever known. I t goes
without saying that the steel workers will do everything possible to secure their demands without such
a struggle; for they well know the toll of suffering that
that they have to pay in all great strikes. But they
6

probably wifl have no choice in the matter, =,the arrogant steel kings will most surely force a s
will never concede the workers' elemen
for the right to organize, better wages,
improved working and living conditions
mak;.ng every form of resistance they
given circumstances. They made this
very outset of the steel organizing mxnpaign * in the Id. . 'i
middle of 1936, when the American Iron and Steel In.n3L
. b,
stitute, the centralorganization of the steel magnates,
declared. in a statement published simultaneously in
375 national full-page newspaper advertisements at a
cost of $500,000 that the steel corporations were determined to resist at all costs the organization of the steel
industry. The militancy of the automobile kings and
coal barons; closely allied with the steel magnates, also
illustrates the employers' determination to fight to save
the open shop.
Nor can the Rooavelt government be counted upon
to prevent the strike ,by forcing the steel trust to estab-.
lish human standards in their industry. What is developing is a head-on cullision between the steel trust and
their long-oppressed workers. Unless all signs fail, the
great steel strike of 19 19 was only a dress-rehearsal for
the b
i
g battle that is looming up in 193 7.
-<I
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The'Vital Issuea at Stake
\

The successful outcome of the present organization
caknpagn in the steel industry will have wide economic,
political and social repercussions. I t will far outrun in
significance the building up of the Amalgamated As7

ftd union of?500,OO 0 WW~&S+.iPnobjective may be. It w3J konstitute
whole working dastover the ape9
.American finance capital and it will deal.blow to company unionism in 811 industries.
gme an enormous stimulus to trade union orgiinin, both iri the mass production industries and

hout industry generally. In 1919 already we
ood that a victory of the great steel strike wodd
;: open the doors far organization in many industr~gbut
now the unidnizing. possibilities of such a victory are
far greater. It %would
prepare the way for the orgknization of many dllions of workers and (would institute
a rdical irnpcoizement-,inwages and working conditions
throughout Am&an ind-.
Victory .in steel-would also have profound affects
upon the trade mion movement as a whole. It wodd'
definitely establish the principle of industrial unionism;
not only in the mass pGd~ctionindustries, but aid also
$hk reorganization of dl trade unionsfuponan induitrial
b i b : It.would lay the basis for a new and progressive
teadesship in the A. F. of L. and would underminerthe
pa-dYzin~.
policies, and conupt regime o f .the-ptesent
' clique of reactionaries who have long been a stumbling
block to the American working class, A s w c a f d b u i
come of the steel drive would so strengthen the hands
of the progressive elements' i n the trade unions that
they would be able -to w r y through .the rcunificitdon
~f the A* F9~f L. in -spiteof the policy d,the Greens,
Wolls, - Hutchesons, Freysi, Whartoris m d other W r
reactionaries -to split the movement. .
. . . ..
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The success of the steel campaign wodd a h greatly push labor forward politically. Not only would the
broad mass movement 'that must develop wOmd the
organization of steel result in making the 3&bow
week, adequate unemployment relief, genuine m i d
security, abolition of industrial spy systems, e l i m k tion of strikebreaking detective agencies, and mmy .
other demands of the workers, active political issuesthat would have to be granted by the employers and the
government, but it would also further the political organization of the workers. The workeri' class consciousness would be aroused, and volume and speed would be
given to the movement for a Farmer-Labor Party and
the eventual development of the People's Front in the
United States. Nor could such popular advances in the
United States fail to have favorable effects upon the
world struggle of the toiling masses in defense of democracy and against hunger, fascism and war.
On the other hand, a defeat for the workers in the
present effort to organize the steel industry would be
a most serious setback to labor generally. The aftereffects of the 1919 steel strike defeat were disastrous
for organized labor as a whole, and a defeat of the steel
workers now would be a worse blow and would give a
great stimulus to reaction and fascism in the United
States. Such a defeat must be avoided at all costs. Victory for the steel workers must and can be achieved if
the struggle is carried through aggressively and with
the systematic mobilization of all of labor's available
forces.
The bosses know full well the possibilities and im-
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pliations of & ~5tgwk
.mi~n
victory in steel. That is why
to fight'militmtlY and to bring incry of forces' against it. The G k n s
reactionaries of the,A. F. of L. also know what
their antiquated systemof craft unionism and
ureaucratic jobs, and that is why they, too,
ghting against the success of the steel campaign,
going to the extent of splitting the i a b r moveC.LO. unions, in order to prevent
.

.

when' the big. steel .strike comes, its wLning must
oe made the first order of business for every progressive
force the United States, A great steel strike would
be a turning poidt not only in the trade union movement, but in American life generally. The fight of the
steel workers for organization is the cutting edge of the
struggle of the tailing masses against the whole lineup
of reaction and incipient fascism in the United States:

+

CHAPTER TWO

STEEL STRIKE STRATEGY

w

organized labor goes into such an ?aportant strike struggle as that evidently n k ,
looming in connection with the organiiation
of the steel industry it must proceed with a definite
strike strategy, based upon a realistic measuring of the
balance of the opposing class forces and modified from
time to time as changing circumstances dictate. We may
be sure that the employers, in their fight to preserve the
open shop, which is worth billions to'them in extra profits, are going ahead with a highly developed strategy.
In the following pages, therefore, I shall undertake
to outline some of the major principles of a sound strategy-and tactics for the steel workersJ struggle; to develop a line of policy that is realistic and justified by the
present economic and political situation and by the general relation of forces between the capitalists and the
workers. The leaders of the C.I.O. and the Steel Workers Organizing Committee are, of course, experienced
strike leaders, and it is not for me to instruct them in
strike strategy. There remains, however, the task of
putting into popular form the principles of strike strategy and strike organization in this very vital situation.
In the development of any severe strike struggle between the workers and their employers the following
general propositions, among others, should be constantly borne .in mind.
First, the cultivation df a firm ideological solidarity
HEN
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in the m p h of the strikers. Tbe-born proceding from

the t m & t i d qloiters'*pr'$@pJtlof divide and connstantlj. attempt to s$it thk workers along k
kd and unskilled, Aperiam~and foreign-born,
and whites, men and 'women, employed and
oyed, adults and youth, Catholic and Protescals and conservatives. This danger is esped. h
insthe boss-rid&n steel invery acute in . i. ~-&
r;

In 1919, the e&$&irs
. !.
and their tools tried with all
these m a n s to pit one section of the workers against-the
other and they m;ey be dipended upon to do so again in
1937. As against,:tkese disruptive moves the workers,
leaders must caqm@r.bya loyal defense in the interests
of all these various groups, thus making them all feel
that they have eyevthing to gain from the success'of
. the general movkment.
They must focus the attention of the masses p r i e ly upon the immediate economic and political demands
of the steel workers and reject all reactionary efforts to
divert. the woqlqris' attention into abstract discussions of
race, religion, politics, etc. Especially there must be no
boss-inspired ~ed-$siting allowed to take root in the
steel workers' movement and. to disrupt its forces. The
steei campaign can be a success only if the maximum
of the workers is achieved
possible.ideological
.
. . solidarity
and mantained.
+
.
Second, another important consideration in the,question of developing a' successful 'strike strategy is the carefbl
'cultivation of a high' morale among -the strikers.
'
This'is very necessary in fighting suck a vicious cdmbination as the steel trust, and morale buiIding m F t be
:
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.
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gone about systematically. The achievement of the ide
ological solidarity previously discussed is an importan
element in developing a good morale among thi work
ers, but it must be supplemented by various other fit
tors, including persistent education of the *-;
regarding. the strike situation and the politid meadpg
of the struggle, by cultivating mass participation $n
strike activities and democratic control of the strike, by
exercising a determined and reliable leademhip, by a
firm but not mechanical discipline, an effective dramatization of the struggle, good strike organization, etc.
Third, a W e r elementary question of good strike
strategy is to proceed upon the general principle of the
offensive. Workers, like soldiers, fight best on the attack. A defensive strike is a losing strike. The steel
workers should never allow themselves to be put on the
deknsive. Every halt must be utilized to organize
a new attack and every attack by the employers or the
government must be offset by some form of renewed
counter offensive. Only when workers are completely
defeated is such a policy not possible. The steel workers
must know how to guard their strike reserves and to
draw upon them whe' a new forward movement is necessary. The present economic and political situation
greatly favors a policy of the offensive.
These elements of strike strategyfirm ideological
m solidarity
of the workers, a high morale in the strike,
a strike that proceeds upon the principle of the offensive-must be constantly borne in mind in developing
every stage of the comingostruggle.But there are many
other principles of strike strategy, no less important,
which I shall now proceed to discuss in some detail.
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The United Front

A us&$

& m a n d )is a fundamental principle of
,$& a11 strikes, as well as military operations.
~nvolvedin it is the unified action of the fightces. Failure to achieve such a unified strike leader- .
rincipally through craft divisions, has cost the
ers many a bitter defeat. Especially is a unified
and and real solidarity of the workers necessary
op kings in the steel, auto, rubber,
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The industrial form of the C.I.O. unions conducting
the struggle in these 'industries lays a solid foundation
for a unified command and the vital strike unity. Neverth'eless a danger 'threatens from the craft union leaders of the American Federation of Labor. These reactionaries, although they themselves for years have done .
nothing to organize the mass production industries, are
extremely antagonistic towards the Committee for Industrial Organization doing the job. They assume a
dog-in-the-manger attitude. I t is more than likely,
therefore, that they will inject themselves into the situation and try to inveigle a fringe of the skilled workers
into their many disconnected craft unions. At the mo, ment I write these lines they are following such a strikebreaking policy in the General Motors auto strike.
Such an action would be a crime against *thesteel,
auto and other ,workers, as it would seriously split their'
ranks and weaken'their fighting force. But no one familiar with the shady history of the reactionary A. F.
of L.leaders need be surprisd to see them adopt such
a disruptive course. They have done it time and again
in strikes of independent unions. The danger is all the

ge%.te~-bam~~ht
the trust rnagrra%%+,
the mrkers dissipate their gtrength fighthg
always greet and encour;lge the craft unio
their splitting tactics.. Nor.would such a d
be unwelc~mpto the Roosevelt ~ , ~ i s ~ a t i o
ing a prolific sowee of slippery campr~mises~
. Thq . i n ~ d u & o nof craft @
ductioq ind*~&esby the A. F.
resisted. nrjlitaantly by every p
whale,l#wr, mvernent as a stri
resiskncq! &odd be supported by .an,%@+ye. sampaignrto edktztte the unorganized massts as to the hist o r i d failure ofrLckft
unionism h thk! mass produdion .
industries, and by a call to these w o r k p not to join the '
craft d o a s but to affiliate themselves with the C.I.O.
industrial aliaps,
.
: If,' neeb.6the craft unions should succeed in
getting into.stael igr the time the strike t&es place, they
must, be dealt {with on a united front basis, and
unity of action mwht in this manner. They should
be drawn into the strike on a full cooperative basis .with
the industrial unions This.means that they ought to be
allowed and induced.& w d regular delegates to :the
strike committees, and likewise to their sub-commi~tees
for relief, defense, publicity, etc., and that they should
also participate in the inass picketing and sther mass
st&& activities. The craft ieaders would object to this,
'so it would have tobe done over their heads by' direct
apped to the membership. Only in the unlikely event,
however, that the aaft unions should become real fattors in the, steel industry would it be practical to make
I,

. f.,
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A good ni&&&jk~te@tn&r forga his maih gb
je&~e,. dtha&&.1&k9,
ltsdm often do so. HCr e h e e ~
to ' d o w himself @ be diverted from his gad bp 'thk
feints afid tri&jbf- t&~opP~nents*
And so ,it is with the
labor ~ t e & i . " l i ctao,
~ ~must always L a p his ma$&
objective in'-miad*H e ,%wconstantly be on the alert
to keep the a p l v . from sidctacing hiu kkok
in~viihentkitti the #I& bwamp of delay3&k$eption
'and:bettayal. &p&MIfr is such l+ilantie mmxsary
.dh& the enemy ;%.'thz powerful arrd rmmm s t k l
I
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Up rill' the prcstnt time the cehtr;sf w
e
g
y of the
steel corporation hadaimedat d-oying
thg *el earnp&gnrby.gi.3ng'higgardly
wage i n a d t o 'the w o k m
'iind by.cultivating the comp&y uni9q :although their
.&a;
pl,ht suppliesof tear gas, ma&@&&s a d other
dedly ~ e p o n$how
s
that they
p r c p h g fa; &tic.
'vklenae.:The employers have b a n unable as yet under
pr-t circumstaqms to-employthe widespread diii18

charge of wakkcrs, suppression of free spe'ecbtmrorisrn
of 'workers and -organizers, etc., with whi&fQhe+yop2
Jr-J>*i
p o ~ the
d q@ihing campaign in 1919.
As soon as the movement of the steel w
proaches the,Esoinq of mass action we may. e
the steel b z t c ~ g v i l go
l into the next stage of t
union stra&gyy,-not only by using more terro
methods, buf;sJsoby having recourse to ,the polic
seel&g. toLdi~sr$
the whole thrust of the
fro& tb;e:coiqia.niesand into a hopeless morass of govern-tzl
m&ttees,
court action, time-killing media-.
tipn, ate,.,Th&first real test of the . steel workers'
s2~efi*a&lMt~--g3~
will come when- they have
organized th.g bdk of the workers and they serve their
&madquppgvtheIron and Steel Institute for a conference 'to wa& but a national trade union .agreement
for the steel-indxistxy.I t is at this point that the steel
companies will attempt to paralyze or kill off the workers' movementby: b g g i n g it down in-a swamp of disintegrating .msnc$wm.
This is whm-,due' workers must be most acutely on
guard and when they have to persist most determine*
towards their centrd objective of forcing c~ncessi~ns
directly from the employers. The steel workers must
not trust their.ause into the hands of the Roosevelt
government. .Thegovernment is allied with many great
capitalist inte~ats,and it cannot be depended'upon to
force the steel trust .to make a settlement favorable to
the workers. cEspecially,must the steel workers beware
that Roosevelt's ''era of good feeling" policy does not
result in some sort of a compromise disastrous to their
movement If Heirst -and other labor haters are en<
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iw~skqrsin.their pc-t

.serve Ilksons to;. the sfeel
develoyjing -glee
:T~(S:=&

mt+
t~yikdd-to.I& - ~ a n d ps f, workenn \-iThes t d .
#&m &mt: not Jbt. <their~mmnt,dtgehaa&
iato
a~~raritiatui~~lta
~&eaendtheir
up
I

.rig&-~h

- ~ k l &:d
!m*r&a-mn~r&$
,&dolls:=p@Q&
e d l @ * j b wi&&w:or
- noo\&*T&&!
h a s h .t;gb.&rfll
,:dietsgePE,~ ~ m k e m~; ?~. ~ s e ~ ~ ~ Ok
n s .
p f e e agaiiist..
~
thQ.
hdYiftk& .
4 .
: * I ;if!.tts,4r
*&e &iai;*
I'!,!; , I ; i!- 1
~ : ~ d 3 q ~ c e r t l t a & iof
t k tihe rmd-emtashbdd..bt.
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settlement between the unions and the employers, and
every step taken. must be directed to acco~~@ish
this
end. The steel wmkm shbuld not enter into &bitration
proceedings or other settlement maneuvers e n w e e d
by the government ynless, first, their maj
have been conceded, and the steel trust is most
to make such preliminary concessions. These
are especidly necessary inasmuch as the wo
have many illusions regarding the libera]. pal
Roosevelt &otrernmentandsuch illusions can easily lead
to defeat.
A Rbadmum M o b i i o n of Foxes

a

Should the employers fail in their inevitable attempt
to liquidate the steel workers' movement through government or court action, or through some such phony
arbitration as employers have so often defeated workers
in the past, then in all likelihood they will set out tobeat
the C.I.O.and the 'Amalgamated Association in an open
strike struggle. Just what kind of a fight they are &tt
ting ready to make may be gathered from the fact that
they are now storing up their plants with machine guns,
rifles, tear gas, etc, and are even drilling their thugs
in preparation - for a fierce strike. The steel workers,
therefore, m-t base their plans upon the practically
certain prospect'of a great strike against the steel corporations.
The pe'rs-ive
of a huge national strike confronts
the workerspleaders with the necessity of k i n g dosely in mind another basic principle of strategyJ that of
mobilizing a full sufficiency of forces to achieve their
objective. .A good strategist never sends a boy to do a
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h t ,the'work?
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.wibg4 able to fight far. T+!@ to the '
they
w@ng'-of thc.m~pemmiaof the st-1 WU&@.-&; the
greatest mbilbtion sf hbor~sforces ever ma&il&<&e
,' ' -.
.
.
q&&,.
i-,;\j
Unitedstat'

&

ilp.
T&@ amd Place
- > .
Another major strategic ~ c ; o n ~ t that
b a must
wsys .beboraa<hmind in strikes is Wt of
htow at~&.bt-& and p h . -The$&npp.
bth &-giirapr moment *nd its mdgp :&-He
spot. UIF,'a
Tb,wmi&ers, if.'they Beep thk -pint d-dy in
!
.
.
..
+?*i,b, a splendid paition to wb..
TbGlGLO; plans to'havethe majofity'af .&a. steel
workers organid by the middle of E
'1937,
after which the de'mmds of the workers d
l be sub' dtttd to sthe American Iron and Steel Institute and a
conference insisted upoh. This is a practicd d e c i d e
and it.dimaxes thi steel movement at a most favorable
mohcnt. URdoubdy by the date set the great msjority af the workem'orn readily be organized. Then,
allowing a .fkw week for prelimkky negotiations, the
steel situation should come to a head somewhere about
the aidtof Mar&.
This is just the time (March 31) when the national
agreeme~t.
of the 500h000bituminous miners expires.
From a stxategk Standpaint-obviouslythe COthing
to do is to ink up the.struggh of the steel workers
with that of the b i t ~ m i n ocoal
~ miners, and possibly
also of the anthracite miners, thus develaping a broad
movement of about a million coal miners and
steel workem This appears to be the aim of thci
C.I.O. and, if so, it is 6owd strategy. The interesb of

.*

:

,

into one genera m ~ ~
inst the dosdy
dligd
steel,
an$ coal m r p a
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o h t strike of *theconemillion steei .workers L
d
hers w ~ d d ~ ~ n cartxmendous
:t
pow&: I t l*odd

r,

other in8wtgh Ear and wide., It mdddmn~titutb;
by fdr the ' g r e a edt~+&tz.
in A&&can L3stm-y. - In.view
of the favorabla~ibkiun'h-idmiwith prodwtion
rapidly 'rising,&eimfsobkd d l m i n m pnd Steei*wsrk-',
em would
bz &2& t~
V ~ X O ~.f~r&g
,
the
r:the first dxm+ ~ . t r aCthds workopen sh+
ers, l i b h*d being. But labor .sho&d %hake -assuri
& .&u~.y..;~m"
by -holcing.i611mcwe horses to the
d-wgon.ift ncedbe. T h e r e , h be
~ contemplated $he
ena&n,!~dthe strilre -smglgik omonibt6e vast ,arthie
of.:~brkiers
in.the aut&~bik, ,rubber and heavy metal arid ,&d. fabrEahk indwtridy- and dm further, .
i5.&-,
:!#..
: . . . :'
. .
. .
The C.I.O. is now conducting org;mii;ea,hn camfisigiis *in:'these :prodacti~nindustries. In 'the
fa-ble
ihr orpnization
po*~ sitaiiion, a0 :
xpsb, its ~aunpai@ a.i~ilyiand~shanld
be spxdcd up
a&at# the unioks bvolpe8 (which+rs,they are led by
thk'C.I;Qi-wo&:not have .to depeadbpan the reactionary i d r ">af
~the
~ A. F; of L.) can alsocprmnt their de-'
m~ndsto 'the3 emplaye~iby &the: end of?Ma&, if not
sd6n&. The c~tranaof they~kkerrskthcrauto, rub&F, ~alazniaiw
h d ather ,hkgh+ vb1nmbIc - and dd&ly
,
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interlinked
-production indwtries s&nultar~eousl~
or at approximately the same time into thei~trbggle:'[
would enormously strengthen the whole rndqement. :.
Such a movement in the key industries would c 0 e ~ i ~ t e
a most effective coordination of the strategic n*i:pr
of opportune time, key place, sutticient power, etc.
each of these great groups of workers has its own .dp
maads, the -entit.e- movement should' be - coordinated+l
around the centritl strategic task of winning the de- "-,;
mands of the steel workers. This main objectivk.especially must not be forgotten in whatever skttlements
are arrived at in the various industries.
I t may turn out in reality that the steel wokkers, coal
miners, automobile workers, etc., will nbt actually coordiriate their national movements-the auto workers
especially are ' m a i n g ihead and developing a great fiational struggle of their own. Possibly, in view of labor's
present &xtkAely favorable position, these great
groups, acting separately, may achieve their major demands. It' is also possible, ilthough most unlikely, that
they Can secure thiir .demands without great strikes,
Nevertheless,' t'he &regoing proposed l h e of strategy,
the linking together of thesi: big movements, with steel
as the center, is basicalljr correct. I t would be a tremendous manifestation of labor's power. I t is the best course
to be followed :under the present drcumstances, the
policy that would insue the ,.workersJ victory most
quickly and completelg!iii these i d t r i e s and open the
doors the widest for a'general advance by labor on all
,. .
.
. 0
fronts.
Every conservatiiie and reactionary influence will be
exerted to prevent the steel workers, miners and other
n* I .
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to,defeat
key w ~ f ~ ~ ~ ~ -jroind$
# ~ 4~4;IIwiK
* j e
them one section rt j~gjne. Tt is, thereI

_

and,~ & e rworkep

ike dune, jointly with thet
oehet industries; at .last '
gq
they
bp*e:,*bwa~
~
from the
~ *~raad
r
t
w 0 r k . r -T$1gg'
to
AW materials
out, 0f;the:sd mius.'If tbe
of ,the..m&oPd b e ~ t k ~ h o o ddo
s '
not agree to.ptohibit the haqlbg of ,pws in a d a d of
sguck rai?ls the. mk-md-file n i l r d warkw$ must .
be a r g a ~ not.
d tp go,thraugh the picket h i s into the
millsills
and d this in spite o f the ,mgewn&ns that a e
&ern to lull
ctwnp~es;are evk%$rndp,pr@g to
their fighting,spit&,..Pailue o f supp~rtfioq the raiG
rOPd m h - p. s in- this e l e p e n t q . respect --was a basic
for thq i~psof-the1919 strike and it must lzot be,
.' repeated.
.
.
&&zed ,labw must .beprepared3 if namsary to
t&pioFt the .a,pp-@ing stel , strike by strike &on
fw and wi& in magp ather ipdwbtris. At all costs the
$eel ~ + ~ r k r stsugg1e
s'
for orpnizafion must be ;Fan.
he fa& of the trade union movement is bound up qrit+
the stpel w ~ r b s ,x&me mayemcnt must nee& be car'A
.
through to v&or)c.
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Political Action in the Strike

A national strike of steel workers, and &pecially a
great combined strike of workers in steel, cod Bnd other
industries, wodd b e highly political in ch&r.
It
would become immediateiy the central political 'i*e-'bf-

the country. NO one would have a keener appre&tio&%;
.
,
of this fact than the employing interests of the co&try* In such a situation, we might be sure that they w h ~ i d k
shout revolution in all keys, and try to utilize the government td stampede-theworkers back to work in a welter of violence and confusion.
"The.workersmust also be acutely aware of the political character of the developing mass struggle and, as
good strategists, be prepared to use every political
weapon at their disposal. I n the great general strike
in England in 1926, one of the worst errors made by
the conservative union leadership was to ignore the obviously basically political character of the movement
and to try to keep the struggle restricted to the economic sphere. This was disastrous, as it prevented the
workers from utilizing their many political means of
struggle. Such a mistake must not be made in the great
struggle that in all probability will develop before the
organization of the steel workers is conceded by the
steel trust*
Let me repeat: political action does not consist in relying upon the Roosevelt government to win the
workers' fight against the steel trust. On the contrary,
the wotkem must mobilize all their political organizations yd sympathizers to ,reinforce the great economic
strike struggle of their unions by bringing mass pres-

'

*&fi&&tj~Pd, %ate iihd nationd, to
of tmops, injunctions, etc, again,st the
'to fdrce a strike settliment fav~rableto
medisfely with the development of
eat .strike movement as now appears certain,
on~~artisan
League, the various Famer-Laty,groups,. the Socialist Party, the &&mist
the progressive.blocs in the national government .
tate legislative bodies, and other political, fprces
athetic to l a b , ' s h ~ u l dall connect up their forces
ic knt;ment and bring d e t e ~ ~ POe d'
l i t i d p~&ure e g( t . . the
,,
steel
,
corporations
.
through
:thelg o v a ~ et*n , ,:y .
~ h d alsa
d be.~ t d i ~ POed
. The O & O ~ of, pF,
l i t i d y .by labor's cornhg forward militantly ~ t itsh
%hole legislitive p-y~gram& the pr~emationand de- velopmknt o f civil rights, for the, 30-hour week, improved social security and unemployrnenf relief, the legal right .to organize, abolition of compaqy unions, prohibition of scab-herding and spy &stems, etc A victory
steel shogd ]bea&omwied by.a.general advance of
Iqbpr ligiqlation in,evuy field.
;
*4.&ktstrike .iq steel, coal and other induskies
.~bu&d
, . . Qlso put immediately upon thk agenda of the day
the question d the political mass strike, and thq workers
must, .frqg, the outset, prepare go toe this powerful
p ~ l. i t wf~rck;,It is ,certajn ,that in . many , localities,
~ ~ ~ 1 $ l y the authorities' tried, to syppps the
'right ~~'~idiit
';and.when {hey used ii&nce qgaipst the
e
,
e
i
s
$4.
, geqerd spike,move~erstS,woddor codd
redto:Also, on.a ,riatiaid &&, should +e steel.trust,
*ripported by 'orbniied capital, maki'a determined ef-,
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fort to defeat the std& by violent meGures, the ques
tion of o nation& gqne~dstrike would alqost.cer;tainly
&come a living iisiie among the ranks of 'lgWG,'+d@rdless of the efforts of the rekctionary trade ~ n i o n ; ~ f i i p l s .
the employers and the government to prevent.%., TI$.;^
political mass strike could have as its o b j e c t i v ~ t h d withdrawal o i troops and the re-establishment of .t$vil
rights in the strike areas, the removal of anti-~abq#government officials, the advancement of important la;'-;,
bor kgislatio~thrust up by the strike situation, against ..\
.
the, shipment of strike.breakers, against evictions of the
. stdkem, for placing of strikers on government unemployed relief, the release' of arrested strikers, and for
the, favorable settlement of the strike.
During the past several years the American working
dass has gained much experience with the weapon of
the mass political strike to'add to its previous experience
with the historic Seattle and Winnipeg general strikes.
It learned very much about this form of political struggle in the great Sad Francisco strike of 1934, as well as
in such local generd.strike situations as those of Pekin,
Terre Haute, Minneapolis, Milwaukee; etc. The many
valuable Iessons from these struggles must be used if
such strikes,occur -during the approaching labor upheaval. Should the organized employers seriously
threateq to beat the strike of the steel workers and the
other mass prQdudion workers, the mas& of American
workers generally must defend the right of the steel
s1aves;:t.o otganize :by using, as the situation may de.
mand, the l o d .or national political. mass strike.
*
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CHAPTER THREE
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C-DANIZATION

HE ,previous chapters I have d i a s e d several'
ajor principles of strike strategy and taaics neeessary to apply in the event of a great strike in
allied industries. It now remains to consider a
others ~ q u i m dto insure the success of such'.
a struggle. The* indude good strike preparations,
thorough-going strike organization, democratic strike .
leadership, mass participation in strike activities, care of
the materia1 welfare of the strikers, mobilization of the .
strike reserves, ere.
I n view of the existing very favbrable economic and
political circumstances a national strike of steel workers,
and especially a great strike of steel workers and coal
miners combined (and also possibly other industries),
would create a situation extremely difficult for the em- ployers to handle, and would probably be of short duration. N.evertheless it would be- dangerous simply to
place rekmce in the prospect of a short, quickly vidorious strike. If the employers determine to fight against
the unionization of the unorganized ~orkers.~rnilitantly
and with a l l their power, the consequence might well
be a long and bitter struggle, even where such huge
masses of workers are involved.
. We must remember that the 1919 steel strike of
365,000 workers lasted three and a half months; also
that the national railroad shopmen's strike in 1922 of
400,000 workers continued for five months, and that
'
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the great c a d ~str&&.tin
1927, involvilrg ~~me-,100,000~
.
worker^^ -mn@wr,
m a r than a year. In fa&&, i write
this,we
n@w3
the powerful strik&kf i ~ 3 ~
maritime
.Ieting over two months 'a.q6:ugh,it ' ,
has shiPP+~ ~6mp1etelyparalyzed on the e
cific ~da&-&& bdly lamed on the Atlantic a
Coast.
'glass workerg also, have been on
ti~nd.
weeks already.
In my-e~tmt,whether the ernploy~mintend to r
to the ka&d&& or not, the best way to .\?riwabout a
.,
p@
zg&&mritMe settlement of the prjhnbde 1337 :,
suike; iRhi& the bosses are forcing on thk workers, .
is t o m&e: : h t stpike the biggest, best organized -and
must k # m i ~ . iAmerican
n
labor history. The principles .
~~atgmaiz~6oon
outlined in this chapter are dof i&e
culated to hidp kchieve this end. They are based on
sound -exp&-&ee :and can be applied not only to steel,
but aIso to slttombbile and such other industries as may
be invofvd in mass strike movements in this period .
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SMlre
Reparation
-

~un&meath
,-$
'the carrying out of a good strike
strategy is a *wz,ugb preliminary organization for the
stmgg1k This is ,equivalent to the recruiting and -in7
ing of .an qrmy kpfore the battle. Such preparation
is
qeci;Jiy necessary. in an industry like steel, where the
workm haw ba$l ,very little experience in organization
and disciplined action, and where the power and-ruthl e $ s n of~ the enemy they have to fight are enormous.
Good . preparation . gives . the workers incomparably
greater striking power. I t is on the same principk that
drilled troops .are far better fighters than raw remuits.
-

n the first thing ro oe ooinsiderw
)$theunion itself. This requires thaip%b
campaign be speeded up so that-practicallp
dy of steel workers are members of the
re the actual, strike begiais. Nor &odd the
kers in the steel plants be left out of the:stecl
in its drive to organidon. Under the tim mu la:
of the great strik&in the a~to,~glass
and other inr*' ' - S s t r i e s . and Pbith itbe workers i resent readiness to .orgdnize this' speeding .can beaeasily accompl~~h.ed--by .
.
the application Q# .broader methods of organizing wbrk .
.>
- t h a t is, the h*giof
:&reat series of mass meetings,
widespread radio brOadasts, vast distribution of literature, etc. It shonid ~ i obe
t difiidt, with*the use of such
ihtense organizing'methods, to soon have the workers
pouring into the h i o n in a great flood. The steel ounpaign should-girn at solidly organizing every worker in
the steel towns, including restaurant workers,. building . t.iq
t r a d ~retail
,
clerk$, etc., into their respective unions . , AC
The extension of the unipn t o include' all ~ossible -.,!i
masses of the steel workers is the &in insurance against
,I
the'develqrnent of the dangerous hck-to-work .move- . t
'hen&%
that are always organized by the :emplpyers in .
.&e@ great stiike and which are now so menadng <inthc
autoh~bi'lestrike. It is, of course, ~itzdiynecessary to
' organize.the most important key p k t s , but the work
1
mu'st'.hot be confined to them. It mukt take in the-whole
4
steel ihdustry.
- .
Can the sitdown, stay-in and wdk-out types of local. '.
::
S&&es
.
'which are nbw .sorapid1y organizing the wwkerb
the1'auto industry also be used in the ,@reliminzi,fyo f ' luhionizing .steel ? This r-insy
to '
.
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!earned. h ' t b .steel movement:grows; as the.worken
f&l the ' 1 3 a ~ i d i :k d gstrong,
,
as t.heir r#&1~
., a'&J
fet~ling
6f power nise9<md,
;asthey k e woriifs bi~~W&&
,-

workem8.ama&zxg.~@a lofig pears of injusti
dine to try lqchstrkks themsehrlp~~
at least int
indepe~dent~
g$ahts. Whethk or m t they
s u ~ e s ~ f d depend
l ~ ; ~upon
~ whthar $the
t&e;qd~&tage,
of such locd stfikes to f k g
md &s%t$pouspartial struggles. In any
-wi@;,do, well to proceed cautiody: in
gmkd carefully against untimely..I d lf$~k.Bsand t~
continue its present strategy of subor&*
all local
kctiviiies to the development of a great ldiGplin4 na,.
tional movement o f ateel workers.
It may well be that the' meth~dof the stay-in strike
will .:be applied to @ny steel plants in the. event og a
geieral etriJcti dm,
Whether or not it m i l l be used
depend upon sevead-factors: if the worlrers consider the
experience in the rautomobileindustry,was successfd, if
the-govqnment is hostile and will permit.the use: bf
gas a d other violence against stay-%I strikers,. if a
union -f&s strong:qough to control the p i w ,without
staying tb,*ifthe prospect is far a Jong or short-str:ikq
e,&* : It (was?thksteel workers,. in Homestead.in. 1&92,
g ~ v e&e
. &st and most heroic American <exaqpde
of,.spikere occqjying struck plants and it m3y bet:fa15
.. .
... 2. .
lowed in the approaching strike.
:%esid&s
signing.up .the - workers .it i s .dso. nemqwy3
as SObiim ppu$abJe, to,set ~p the new l o d uni6ag.of
the Amdga-ted A s s ~ $ t i ~ n ~ to get,
fwgi:
*@ng;.:Tbesq locals ahou&$be sot, men* %pn;ql.
qppT
i
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plastered over the entire steel industry, and also popularized far and wide throughout the whole country..
With myriads of bulletins, leaflets, stickers, posters, &., 1;
as well as'haad d o ampaigs, newspaper advertiG-1 . ments, etc.; the workers and the general public
be taught th.c.-mmningof the struggle and be
vised of its promess. -Great mass . I d , district
tibnal rmkGd-61e conferences and meetings of steel ,,.
w o r b itnd as things approach a head, a great mass
strike vote, should be utilized to. educate and organize
thesteel workers for the coming struggh.
:Theold adage "Well begun is half doney?applies to
'itpike strategy as well as to other activities. The first
blow is.often decisive. Usually trade union strikes are
badly organized, which weakens them from beginning
to end. But this one must be diflerent. I t should be
thoroughly prepared, organizationally and ideologically. If this is done, then when the steel workers almost
certainly strike in 1937, their walkout will be so complete that "no one will be left in the mills even to blow
the whistle".
h - c

SKke Leadership

One of the basic .means for building a strong strike
and fdt ,the working out of good strat& is the- development of ahdemocratic strike leadership throhgh national and local broad strike committees. Usdally A. I?.
of L. strikes are managed by small and remote committees of bmeaucratic officials. These people, whose
conservative and slipped policies make it necessary
for them to prevent iank-and-file "interference in the
strike controlay,remain quite detached from the workingmasses. They issue arbitrary.commands to the workers,'
33
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iwmzlt+diyapply

s&ikc cornmkke*

the po=rfui weapon of.the,br
>I

:

,Thedenimtizatim:.af the strike leadership sh
start at the -top, Ti& national leading committee
whole strike 'should.consi~tnot d y . of the national '*- .
union execdves but also of striker representaavm $,
from the vdti~bsstriking areas )(and industries, if &e
than sted"is ' iavolved) . This - b r d . committee,
$
wkk ,
propar departments for publicity, ~dEefand defense, -. ,,,
&odd deal .with major questions of-pbiicy. It should
meet fkquently and have a s d : e i b t i v e \committee
awry on the strike leadership 'between,&tings.
' Zarge departmentalized strike c~rnmitttm,~
.based
upsn the regular tinion officials plus a broad iepresehtrtion of mill strikers, should also be organized in the
rcspettive steel towns and districts,' a9 -local -circumstances 'may . dictatewEach steel mill ,should . also, liave
its own brbad strike ,committee. The mill strike committees' should - conduct 'their iocal activities under the
leadersiiip of the local' or districtstrike' committees;
the size of the committees varying according the size
of the mills, the -;of rep2"esentah rangkg from one.
memkr for each 25 workers .to,.onetmember for each
100-;wO&erswSuch miil gtrike committees should be
, thoroughly representative of all departments, special
m e beiirgtaken also to see that Negroes and f ~ i g n bo& .workers are fully r@resented.and elected to re.spomle lbading posts. - he :women?strade union am- '
iliaries should #berepresented]in.the strike cammittees. i
The mill strike committees have a maze of functions.
. Espdcidly complicated are their tasks in the case,of .
stay-& strikes. They.have. tb:-beorganized, through
.
435
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60 attend to pi&et&g,, discipline, .food,
ments, medical care, errtertainment, dethe local al@ikeminmitteeand other
etc. Consequently, the my1 committees,
y responsive ta, the needs and control of

,

e strike committees, national, d i s t r i d local and
, should be f d y authorized to conduct the strike all its phases, .&e various regular trade,union organs,
such as national ~ q d c i v ebbards, district councils, lop1
unions, etc.,
only to transact routine business
not i m m e d i ~ t e I y * . ~ e dwith
e d the strike. The various
strike c o m m i ~ ~ : , & o be
~ l 'elected
d
on the eve of the' .
.-.
strike. Before & -strike is ended the national strike - ,
committee shad4 iubmit the proposed terms of settle- .
ment for a refmdum.vote by the strikers.
Thege principle8'pf democratization atid departmen- talization should'dsb be introduced into the A. A. structure as the unit~q3 built. The A. A. constitution k.
owete, unfitted f o the
~ steel industry and &6uld be
completely -written.
MauS(rite AChv2imi
-.
The working >outof a good striki. stratejgy requires
the highest degree of mass participa.tioii by the strikers
in the organized activities of the Strike. More than that,
it also involves drawing .@e strikers' families .into
these activities, for the- strikers' women and children
are.also very effective fighters and morale builders.
Qdyby such a general participation of the whole strikebound population and the development cf .the highest
~degeit:
of ardvity possible by men, women and childretl,
c q ~the maximum striking power of the workers be
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realized. In this respect again, the coming steel strike
must be vastly superior to the czrdinary A. F. of L..
strike, in which, because the conservative leaders fear
the growth of militancy among the rank and file, only
a small percentage of the workers,. not to speak of
their f a d i e s , actually carry on the strike, the great
mass remaining passive.
In previous~~ges
I have discussed various forms of
cultivating a high degree of mass strike activity-the
holding of democratically .elected local, district and
national rank-and-file pre-strike conferences to f ormulate-and popularize the workers' demands and to elect
the union officials, the taking of a national mass strike
vote, democratic participation in the broad strike committees, general voting-upon all settlement proposals,
etc. T o these measures should be added the holding of
frequent mass meetings during the strike; mass parades of strikers; mass marches of men, women and
children from district to district and mill to mill; the
sending of small delegations, or flying squads of workers, from one area or industry to another; the teaching.
of the strikers to sing labor songs in their meetings and
demonstrations; the development of sports activities
for the youth ; the holding of social affairs, etc.
But the most important of all forms of mass strike
activities is mass picketing. Good picketing is a decisive
factor in every big strike-that is why employers are
so rabidly opposed to it. Picketing is usually grossly
neglected in the ordinary A. F. of L. strike, only a few
of the workers carrying it on, and then merely in a
desultory fashion. The consequence is a great loss in
the holding power of the strike. The best way to con37
\

duct picketing is on a mass basis. Not only should all
the str&ms be mobilized for picketing, but their women
and children as well. In addition, prominent liberals and
others should be brought into the strike areas from the
outside to march in the picket lines. Where one or more
industries are strikhg, joint picketing should be organized. The unemployed can play a most important role
in picketing, and the members of non-striking unions
#should also be systematically drawn into the work.
Women's and children%picket lines should be organized on special o-ions.
This system of broad mass
picketing raises en~rmouslythe political level, . enthusiasm and r e s i s w power of the strikers. I t has been
used effectively i n 7 m yI.W. W. and T.U.U.L. strikes,
by the more pr~gressiveA. F. of L. unions, and by
many unions in foreign countries. When the 1937 steel
strik&&mes, the progressive C.I.O. should adopt the'
modern, effective .system of mass picketing.
The picket line should be well organized, not mere
crowds of workere. It should be 'imder .the control of
the picket committeej which is a section of the strike
committee. The .picketers should be organiisd into
squads, each squad heided -by a carefully s e b d captain. All strikers shbuld he required to do their bit at
picketing. The youth espe~iallyshould play a big role.
in the L~rganization
of the picket lines. The picket committee must, maintan pickets around the mills at all
times, whether or :not they are trying to operate with
scabs. Especially must there be great mass picket lines
on Monday mornings and upon all occasions when attempts are k i n g 'made to bring stabs into the mills.
Often. the .difference.between -bad picketing and good .
3'8;
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picketing fssjthe difference between a lost and a won
strike.
. Strike Publidty
The question of a well-organized strike publicity is
most fundamental to the success of a great strike in
steel, or a combined strike of steel, coal, auto, etc. In
such a big strike the capitalists will frantically howl
thatrthe whole movement is an insurrection, a revolution, and they will throw their entire publicity machine,
the newspapers, radio, etc., into the task of terrorizing
the public and of driving the workers back to the mills
in a welter of violence and confusion. In the 1919 steel
d effectively,' with the
strike they used such a ~ e scare
help of the Wilson government.' In. the San Francisco
general strike in 1934 they also loudly shrieked rwolution and created a hysteria among sections of the
population, and they do the same thing to a greater or
lesser extept in every strike. We may be absolutely
certain, therefore, that their poison-gas campaign would
be infinitely worse in the case of the prospective nationwide steel or steel-coal strike involving up to a millhh
or more workers.
To combat successfully this vidqus strikebreaking
propaganda offensive of the employers will be basic for
the-winningof &e strike. In 'order to create a favorable
public'ophion it is necessary that the workers develop
a great pu6lidty counter-offensive of. their own. They
mtst dissipate the charges of revolution by centering
the whole agitation around the immediate economic
and political demands of the struggle. Th,ey should relentlessly expose the vast riches and profits of the employers and the health-destroying; spirit-killing poverty
39
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of the workers, the terrorization and suppression of
civil rights by the bosses7gunmen, the great signifivce
to American democracy of a v i c t o i b y the workers, etc.
The strikers must know how to dramatize their struggle
by sending women's and children's &legations to the
state legislatures and to Congress, by securing investigations by government and citizens' committees, by covering the country with a network of sympathetic mass
meetings, by staging great mass demonstrations of all
kinds throughout the strike areas, by monster mass
picket lines, etc.
Not the least of this essential publicity work is the
education of the strikers themselves, who will be subjected to the fiercest propaganda barrage from the employers in attempts to stampede them back to work. The
striking workers should be systematically taught the
meaning and implications of the strike through a plentiful flow of regular bulletins, special leaflets,,mass meetings, radio broadcasts, etc. Especially must they be kept
informed in detail as to the progress of the strike itself.
In this connection, in case of a hard strike, among other
such measures to be adopted, rank-and-file delegations
should be sent from district to district so that workers may be directly informed as to the status of the strike
from personal observation. In 1919, ,in the later stages
of the struggle one of the most effective strikebreaking
methods of the bosses was to have fake delegations of
warkers visit various strike districts and then start false
reports and demoralization among the strikers, both in
their home towns and other centers. Neglect of the fundamental task of 'systematic education could easily result
disastrously in a bitterly fought steel strike.
40

T o meet these huge.educationa1 tasks of creating at
favorable public opinion and of keeping'confusion out
of the ranks of the strikers, thernational strike committee should set up a special publicity section, with
an experienced publicity director in charge. This publicity' department, in addition to buildhg its own immediate publicity machinery, should systematically
mobilize the trade union, revolutionary and liberal
press, as well as friendly radio broadcasters and newspapermen working on the capitalist press. All these elements cooperating together would constitute a great
educational force, one that could make the voice of the
strike heard loudly and clearly in every corner of the
. country.
Strike Relief

Strikes, like armies, march on their stomachs, and
many are the strikes that have been lost through hunger.
In making ready for a great strike in steel it is necessary
that all preparations be made to build up a strong system of strike relief, despite the probability of the struggle being of short duration. I n the matter of relief
work, as in so many other of their phases, usually American strikes are very weak. Strikes which provide relief
systems that can serve as types for the coming strike
were the 19 19 steel strike and the 1926 Passaic textile
strike."
The strike relief machinery should be in operation
not later than two weeks after the strike begins, because

* See The Great Steel Strike d i t s Lessom, by William
2. Foster, and The Pavsaic T e d Strike, by Mary Heaton
Vorse.
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from the outset there are always emergency h e s requiring attention. The C.I.O. general call for a strike
fund ought to go out immediately upon the declaration
of the strike. This to be supported by calls from the
A. F. of L., individual trade unions, state federations,
central labor cofincils and othet sympathizing organitions. Of course, the reactionary A. F. of L. leaders will
kither openly or covertly oppose such strike support, ;
but their opposition must and &n be broken down by
rank-and-file pressme.
.
The striking union or unions'should set up an organd
i d relief department i s a sub-section of the general
strike committee, withrari experienced relief organizer
in charge. Strike relief work has two general aspectscollection and distributi&-nd
there must be created
sp&l organization for each. On the collectian side, the
organization shauld consist of: (a) trade union strike.
relief committees in various cities and towns; (b) united
front relief committees or other workers' organizations in the same localities; (c) special relief committees of
liberal professionds, clericals, pacifists, writers, etc. All
these committees are to be coordinated through the national relief department of the strike .committee. A
corps of relief collectors and organizers should be put
in the field by the national relief organiation. Depots
should be established in all important centets for the
collection of cash, food and other strike supplies. National and local relief conferences ought.to be held
wherever praqtical. There can be drawn into the relief
collection work not only tpde pnions, but also churches,
Y.M.C.A.'s, Negro organizations, - fraternal societies,
farmers' unions, veterans' organizations, cooperatives,
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unemployed workers' organizations and workers' po.
litical parties.
The, distribution side of the relief is to be handled
by special relief committees of strikers in the strike
areas, under supervision of their respective strike committees. The relief committees require sub-committees
to investigate needy cases and to check up generally on
the distribution of relief. In this sphere, the strikersJ
womenfolk can do very important work.
At the outset of the strike all efforts should be made
to get the strikers on the home relief lists upon the
same basis as the unemployed. This can be accomplished
in many places with the proper political mass pressure.
Inasmuch as regular strike benefits could not, in all
probability, be paid in a national 1937 strike of steel
workers, the strike relief necessarily takes thi-ee major
forms: (a) distribution of cash for the strikersJ special
expenses; (b) amnion8kitchens where food is prepared for the strikers and their families, with special
food for the smaller children (4) commissaries from
which families may carry home groceries, clothing and
other strike relief sumlies.
Money.The organLtions farming the C.I.O. should
place upon themselves heavy strike assessment^. Other
unions should adopt voluntary assessments. This financial.income should be supplemented by tag days, shop
.collections, social affairs, special milk funds, etc., organized by the strike committees in the various centers.
Food. Great concentration must be made upon the
coli&tion of non-perishable foods by the strike cornrnittees, house-to-house, collections being organized.
Special attention should be given to collecting &trike
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relief supplies in the immediate .strike areas and surrounding territories. The farmers provide a rich source
for food collection in such big strikes and their organizations need to be contacted.
Shelter. This is always a great problem in large
strikes. It must be attacked in a variety of ways: by
doubling up the evicted families with others, by moratoriums in rent paying in strike-bound towns, by extension of credit to strikers by landlords, by court action
and mass pressure to prevent evictions, etc. Where
company towns exist, tent colonies and barracks may be
necessary to take care of the wholesale evictions. The
shutting off of gas, electricity and water can often be
stopped by exerting political pressure upon the local
authorities. In some instances cash is necessary to meet
rent, water, light and similar expenses.
Clothkg. Systematic collections of all kinds of clothing should be made by the relief committees all over
the country. Local clothing repair units can be established in the strike towns by sympathetic women and
tailors. Cobblers should be organized to take care of
shoe repairs, etc.
Medical Aid. In every strike center medical units of
voluntary doctors, dentists, nurses, etc., should be established. Medical units also may be organized outside
and sent into the strike areas by the relief committees.
In addition, there should be committees of outside doctors to visit and to give publicity on conditions in the
strike districts.
Relief collection and distribution must be handled
basically as a political question, not as a matter of charity. In the strike districts, strike relief should be so
t

,
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organized as to stimulate mass picketing, each picketer
being furnished with a card which is puhched to indicate the amount of picketing he has done. The collection
of relief in the various cities should be utilized to arouse
the dass-conscious solidarity of the workers and to
draw the broadest masses of workers into active support
of the strike. The whole relief apparatus, collection and
distribution, must be utilized to popularize the objectives of the strike, to prevent the recruitment of strikebreakers, to defend the strikers' civil rights, and to
bring pressure to bear upon the employers and the government for a favorable settlement of the strike. A
well-organized relief system can exert a tremendous
force in strengthening the strike, both economically and
politidly.
Strike Defense

In every strike the question of defending the civil
rights and personal safety of the strikers and the union
leaders constitutes an important problem. Especially is
this problem acute in a great strike against the lawless
and violent steel barons. Defense activities are not only
a matter of court action, but especially of mass pressure
of the strikers and the widest possible masses of strike
sympathizers against the government and the employers. The national strike committee requires a legal department which organizes this branch of strike work.
Here the International Labor Defense can also play an
important part. A staff of voluntary attorneys should be
recruited nationally and in the respective strike areas.
Attacks on the civil rights of the strikers by the employers, in whatever manner, must be militantly re-

I

sisted. All the forces of the strikers, the outside labor
movement, the strike relief organization and the: sympathetic masses generally should be mobilized to protest
against such attacks on the democratic rightse of the
workers, through the holding o f mass meetings, sending'
of delegations to the state legislatures and Congress.
When injunctions am issued forbidding the right -of
free speech and assembly the strikers should follow the
traditional American trade union policy of ignoring such
court orders. When troops are brought into a strike area
the strikers must not only firmly insist upon the maintenance of their civil rights, but also know how to fraternize with the saldiers and thus win s many as
possible of them to the side of the strike.
Vigilant protection must' be constantly given to the
persons of the strikers and their leaders; when either
striker or leader is arrested for strike activities, he
'should be promptly ddfended legally and polidcally.
Where there is . danger of violent attacks upon the
strikers' meetings or upon their leaders by gunmen and
vigilantes, these meetings and leaders must be personally defended; such protective heasure~being organized by the picket committee m&being especially the
task of the youth. Against the' coihpany-controlled violators of civil rights and for the personal safety of
strikers and leaders the strikers should make active ve
of all available political institutions, including the arrest
and prosecution of the armed thugs; the securing of injunctions against the violators of the workers' civil
rights; the remov4 impeachment and election defeat of
lawless city and state officials.
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M o b i i g tho Strike Reserves

Every good general understands that a basic p'art of
his strategy is carefully to mobilize and utilize his reserves, and the need to do this is no less acute in a
strike, especially in the case of a great strike in steel and
allied industries. Such a strike would for the outset
have vast potential reserves, created by the profound
sympathy the strike would awaken in the toiling masses.
These masses would realize that not only were the
strikers',interests involved in the struggle, but also their
own living standards and democratic rights. The strike
leadership must know how to organize ind make the
maximum use of this favorable mass sentiment of these
great reserves. Usually, this kind of work, like the
various other tasks that go to make up 3 strong strike,
are grossly neglected in A. F. of L. strikes. Such must
not happen in the steel strike, for we may be sure that
the steel trust will mobilize every reactionary influence
in the United States behind its cause and the workers
will need every possible ounce of support for theirs.
The question of mobilizing the reserves of a national
steel strike involves not only developing the solidarity
of the workers' main forces directly-the support of
the unorganized masses of workers, of the members of
company unions, of the unemployed, of the non-striking
trade unions, of workers' cooperatives and of the wdrkers' political parties-but also the mobilization of the
huge masses bf semi-proletarian and petty bourgeois
sympathizers who are actively interested in the winning
of the strike. This necessitates the development of
united front committees of youth dubs, fraternal societies, ch-xches, peace movements, professional guilds,
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women's
Negro orpimtiofis, farmers' cooperative~,veterans7 asso&tions, etc, for various strike
tasks. . In the preceding pages 1 *havesketched concretely
soole ,bf the ways in which these very vital petty byp i s and semi-prbletarian strike reserves.& be utilized, including their.prtieipation in .p*ubiiCitywork,
k c h n i d aid for s.trikem3-defense and relief activities
and general politid : wqrk. T o facilitate the ,mobiliza
tion of these rest$we% a national citizens7 committee,
comprising such -1ibed strike sympathizers-including
politicia~~s,
e d ~ t p r -scientists,
s~
writers, artists, etc*should be set
at-the commencement of the strike.
This liberal. committee must work closely with the nhciond strike committee in political activities in support
of the strike, aqd ,&odd stimulate the, formation of
local relief c o m m i of
~ ~liberal strike sympathizers.
Especially in the str* .areas is it necessary to build up
skdlar strike citizens?committees of professionals, small
businessmen, clergymen, white coUar workers, officehorns and representatives of varioibs mass bganizations, t6 offset the strikebreaking activities of the everpresent and dangerous citizens7committees organized by
the employers. A national strike in steel and allied indGtries must be made a great rallying issue for fihe
major mas& of the democratic forces, of the United
Wtes to win the struggle.
A
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CHAPTER FOUR

CONSOLIDATING THE
'""TORY

I

a fundamental principle of strategy, whether
military or .labor, to follow up the victory by
pushing back the enemy on every front and to capture all possible of his strongholds, In the months ahead
the C.J.O. leaders, as well as the progressive forces
generally of the labor movement, must give this strategic principle serious consideration.
Lenin once wisely remarked that we never can have
real victory unless we also know how to retreat when
need be. A good 'general always bears this thought in
mind. In this situation, however, there need be no perspective of retreat. The strategy must be based on the
offensive, and animated by a spirit of daring and indomitability. The stage is all set for a great labor victory, provided only that the trade union leadership rises
to the occasion, to the height of its tasks. This victory,
which can be so readily won, must be realized to the
full in all its possibilities and implications. In the first
chapter of this pamphlet I indicated the great importance to the working class of a victory in the steel industry. Now let us look at this whole matter a little
more concretely.
T IS

Orgadzing the Millions of Unorganized

When, early in 1936, the workers of France, fighting
against the rising menace of fascism and organized in
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a great united front of Radicals, Socialists and Cornmu-

&ts, defeated the reactionary forces and elected the
present Popular Front government,' one of the aftermaths of their victory-wisthat within a year the French
trade union movement increased its membership from
some 1,500,000 to over S,000,000. This is about
equival&t to the American trade union movement (considering the differences in size .and industrialization of
France and the United States), leaping up from ,'its
present low figure of about 3,500,000 to a membership
of 15,000,000 or 20,OOO,OOO. A victory in steel in the .
United States, if properly followed up, would undoubtedly give.a tremendous stimulation to trade union
organization in general in this country. I t is a question
whether there will be as great an advance as that which
followed the victory of the Popular .Front government ?<
in France. But certainly success in the steel industry * g
would throw the door wide open for the organization
of many millions of workers. The extent to which the
possibilities of the situation will be realized will depend largely upon the ability and farsightedness shown
by the trade union leadership.
Even in the very favorable situation after a great
victory in steel, the organization of these millions of
workers can only happen in the fullest measure if the
progressive forces everywhere in the trade union movement make the task of organizing the unorganized all
labor's first order of business. Determined drives must
be made to begin the unionization of the huge masses
of unorganized in all fields, the millions of general
metal and electrical workers; the mass of textile work50
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ers, the army of truck, bus and taxi drivers; the great
numbers of unorganized packing house, metal mining,
building trades, food workers, lumber workers,. agricultural workers, etc, as well as those in the auto, rubber, aluminum, oil, glass and other industries now being
organized by the C.I.O. Nor shauld there be forgotten
the masses o f white collar workers, teachers, technicians,
oftice workers 'and government, employes, who are increasingIx re& for organization.
Big inroads by the trade unions into these great unorgani~edmillions can be made by the labor movement
if the work is gQne about with system and decision.
Every branch of organized labor must take up the
organization work. The C.I.O. should seize upon the
event of a victory in steel to redouble its own efforts
to organize the mass production industries aad to stimd a t e ail sections of the labor movement into the greatest.
organizing campaign in the history of American labor.
The re~tionaryA. F. of L. Executive Council~mustbe
compelled by mass pressure to support the growing
organizing campaigns, or at least hot to sabotage them.
Every international union, state federation of labor,
city central body and, local union should begin organizing work in its respective sphere. The whole l&r
movement must surge with organization work. This is
the first task in consolidating a steel victory, by registering it in the fundamental field of organization among
the unorganized millions. If this task of organization is
well conceived and properly carried out, it will mean
incomparably more power and militancy for the labor
movement in this country.
,

I
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Reozgullb the Trade U*M

The organization of steel and other mass production,
industries, with its establishment of the principle of industrial unionism and its smashing victory over campany unionism, its bringing of millions of unskilled and
semi-skilled workers into the unions and its giving rise
to a militant and union progressive leadership in these
industries, would necess&ilihave profound effects upon
the whole trade union movement in many directions.
It would lay the basis for a far-reaching revamping of
organized labor's policies, structure, leadership and general outlook. I t would provide the workers with a splendid opportunity to free themselves finally from the
mess of reaction and crookedness that has marked A. F.
of L. officialdom for many years past. To consolidate the
victory in steel especially requires that it register itself
in full force in this sphere by a profound reorganization of the trade union movement as o whole.
The further substantial advance of the trade union
movement in this country necessitates breaking the control of the Greens, Wolls, Hutchesons, Ryans, Freys
and-the other top misleaders of labor, together with that
of their local understrapper gangsters, racketeers and
small-time reactionary bureaucrats. These people have
stood in the way of the workers' progress all too long,
drawing their enormous salaries and shamelessly playing the game of the bosses. More and more the workers
are evidencing a disposition to get rid of them, as is
shown in such recent elections as those among the New
York painters, teamsters and longshoremen and in many
other places. And with a real victory in steel, this ten52
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dency would be enormously strengthened. The workers,
make a
grand sweep of the whole reactionary crew that now
dominates so many trade unions.
The trade unions must also break finally with their
reactionary top A. F. of L. officials' traditional policy
of dass collaboration, and begin to orientate towards
policy of dass struggle. Fifty years of bitter experience
teaches that class collaboration, based upon the false
principle of the harmony of the interests of capital and
labor, has nothing but defeat to offer the workers. The
workers can gain nothing by their officials wheedling
the bosses and adapting the unions to the latter's needs.
h he^ can only go forward by a policy of struggle. The
workers can win only what they have the power and
determination to fight for. It is high time that the trade
union officialdom -ms jarred loose from the bosses'
apron-strings. For the first time in its history the American trade union movement will stand on its own legs,
both in the economic and the political struggle.
A further vital part of the necessary reorganization
of .the labor movement is that the trade unions must be
thoroughly democratized. T h e workers should put a
final end to present baneful conditions of nation4
unions that never meet in convention; local unions that
go on for years without holding meetings, stolen trade
union elections; officials self-elected for life ; expulsion
of workers because of their political opinions; unions
controlled by notorious racketeers; trade union agreements adopted without rank-and-file sanctiop; corrupt
leaders furnishing union-card strikebreakers to employ-

. if given proper leadership, will be ready to
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ers; open dkfiance of majority d e by miion officials;
union conventions comprised almast entirely of paid .
ofticialg, etc., etc. The present' forward surge of the
workers, especially in the event of a victory in steel, is
just the time to deal a mortal blow to this whole poisonsystem of autocracy andl corruption-that has cursed
. the American labor movement for so many years.
The badly needed reorganization of the trade union
movement should also =esult in placing not only the
unions in the mass production industries upon an industrid union hasis, but the craft unions generally .as
well. Steps ought to be taken in every industry where
the craft unions are established to gradually consolidate
them into industrial unions through a process of doser
cooperation, federation and amalgamation.Practical first
steps towards this industrial goal are: one general national agreement for all railroad trades and a strengthening of the railroad federation movement by including
all of the twenty-one railroad unions; uniform agreements in the building trades to expire on the same date;
amalgamation of the metal tradtx into one industrial
union; formation of a national maritime 'federation.on
the Pacific Coast model; orpGizaton of *ageneral transport workers' federation; creation of a federation of the
needle trade unions closer affiliation of the printing
. trades; federation of the food trades unions, etc. A vietory in steel and in other mass production industries
would greatly facilitate this advance of the craft unions
generally towards industrial unionism. Craft unionism,
a product of the horse-and-buggy age, was obsolete 30
years ago and it is a heavy drag on the progress of the
54
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working class. It must be superseded by a modern,
effective system of industrial unionism in all industries.
Reunite the Americas Federation of Labor

The present split in the A. F. of L. is a menace to
the interests of every worker in this country. I t leads
to a weakening of the organizing campaign in the mass
production industries; it causes craft union strikebreaking during strikes of the industrial unions (auto, radio,
etc. ) ;it divides labor's forces politically, and it weakens
the working ddss on every front.
The split is the rotten fruit of the reactionary Green
bureaucracy which, fearing that the organization of
the millions of unorganized, semi-skilled and unskilled
will jeopardize its rich sinecures, have gone even to the
extent of splitting the labor movement in order to prevent the organization of the unorganized and to maintain its own worse than useless leadership. I t traitorously
and illegally . suspended C.I.O. unions with over
1,25 0,00 0 members, simply because the latter seriously
undertook the organization work in the mass production
industries that the A. F. of L. Executive Council has
stubbornly refused to do. No one but the employers
and a handful of reactionary trade union leaders profit
from such a shameful spectacle. The breach in the
ranks of labor must be healed. The present situation,
and especially if the steel workers are victorious, offers
a splendid opportunity for the progressive forces of
labor to mend the split in the A. F. of L. on a sound,
progressive basis.
I t is necessary first of all to prevent the present split

-

from spreading. The workers must. refuse to unseat
C.1.0. union delegates in the state federations and
central labor unions if ordered to do so by the A. F. of
L. Executive Council. They must hold intact the labor
movement at the bottom, even if it is split at the top.
There must also be no splitting of international unions;
wherever the question of afliation to the C.I.O. or A.
F. of L. develops, the principle of majority rule must
prevail in all such cases. I t is important also that the
C.I.O. retain its present status as a national committee to
carry on organization work in the basic industries, as
this will prevent the reactionaries from spreading the
split into a l l sections of the labor movement, as they
would do if two rival national labor federations faced
each other. Meanwhile, while putting these emergency
measures into effect, a unity campaign must be carried
on far and wide throughout the whole trade union
movement, to win as many as possible of the trade
unions to condemn the splitting policy of the A. F. o f .
L. Executive Council and to give active support to the
organization work of the C.I.O. Especially must the
local A. F.' of L. craft unions stand solid with the
C.I.O. industrial unions and vice versa in the case of
strikes, rind under no circumstances permit their members to work when strikes are in progress.
The C.I.O. is based upbn the most fundamental sections of the proletariat, those in the heavy, mass production industries. I t is doing incomparably more vital
and important work than the reactionary * E x d i v e
Council of the A. F. of L. The latter is a brake on the
labor movement, while the C.I.O. is carrying on the
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most fundamental work of organization and stimulating
labor's progress generally. The C.I.O. already dearly
has the backing of an overwhelming majority of the
organized trade unionists, as well as of great masses of
the unorganized workers. And as its work of organization proceeds the mass support of the 'C.I.O.will increase by leaps and bounds i n all sections of the working class.
It is most vitally important that the C.I.O. organize
this vast supporting sentiment in the craft unions, so that
these progressive forces, united on a sound program of
industrial unionism and the organization of the unorganized, can break once and for all the deadly grip of
the Executive Council reactionaries on the labor movement and throw their full strength into organization
work. In the present circumstances the victory over these
reactionaries will not be too difficult, if the C.I.O. will
give more attention to this matter and take more active
steps to organize the progressive forces throughout the
labor movement.
Under the consequent heavy pressure, the machine of
the Greens, Wolls and other reactionaries in the craft
uniolis would soon collapse and the progressives secure
the 1eadership.of the labor movement. And in the process the unity of labor could be re-established, despite
the reactionary opposition. The present great surge forward of the masses, especially in the event of a victory
in steel, must result in uniting the forces of labor-!
F. of L. craft unions, C.I.O. industrial unions, railroaa
brotherhoods and millions of unorganized workersinto a great united, progressive A. F of L. based upon
industrial unionism.
.

A victory in steel, with its r e d t a n t lpas enthusiasm
and increased fighting spirit, must especially be utilized
to strengthen the w o r k politically. It is disistrous .
folly for the workers to support a d depend upon the
old political parties. This is true also of the present
administration. The Rooscvelt gover-ent
is a capitalist government and will of its own volition do nothing to infringe upon the real interests of the great finsncial rulers of the c a m t r y , nor has it done so in the
past. All the real concessions that the workers will get
from the present government is what they have the
organized powv and good sense to fight for. The workUs and other toilers.must have their own political party
and program and ghre them strong mass support.
.
The next months should see great political activity on
the part of the workers, farmus, and lower middle
dass elements. In conferences and meetings they should
map out united front programs of state and national
legLlative demands and then give theq the ~ o l i dbackT
ing of all their trade unions, farmers' organizations,
.progressive blocs in Congress and state legislatures, and
of the workers' and farmers' politid parties. Meanwhile, they should also systematidly set up local and
state Farmer-Labor Parties, wherever there is a sutliuent mass basis. This whole developing political movement should go in the direction of the formation, as
soon as possible, of a great m t i ~ d
Farmer-Labor Party, the beginning of a broad People's Front in the
United States, to wage struggle against the growing
menace of hunger, fascism and war.
Clearly, the C.I.O. has a heavy responsibility to fur-
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ther this progressive political work. The reactionary
A. F. of L. leaders have refused to develop independent
political aftion by the workers and they know no other
politid policy than to keep the masses enchained to the
Republican and Democratic Parties. I t is highly dangerous further to neglect building a great FarmerLabor Party of the toiling masses. These masses are
more and more showing signs of breaking with the two
old parties, and if orffanized labor does not give them
the lead with a new party, they are exposed to the
serious danger of falling u&r the control of such
demagogues and fascists as Hearst, Coughlin, Smith,
Lemlre, Townsend, etc: The organization o f the workers in the mass production industries, and particularly
if there is s victory in steel, will lay su6ticiently broad
foundations for a great Farmer-Labor Party in the
United States and otherwise facilitate its development.
History thrusts upon the C.I.O. the responsibility of
bringing such a party into actual being.
Ihe.Struggle for World Peace

With the great strengthening of the trade union
movement in numbers, program, leadership and class
consaousness that will come from the organization of
the workers in steel and other basic industries the trade
union movement of this country must take a more positive part in the struggle to maintain world peace and
democracy. The world is -facing the war threats and
tyranny of the fascist aggressors, the Hiders, Mussolinis, Fra~lcos,etc., and more and more the democratic
forces of the world, with the Soviet Union at their head,
are organizing to prevent these fascist barbarians from

)delugingthe world with a new and more'terrible bloodbath. The American workers must do their share, side
by side with the democratic masses of other countries,
to hold back this threatening slaughter and to defend
the very exiitence of civilization itself.
The A. F. of L. policy of non-participation in world
affairs is f a t d y wrong. Despite the sophistries of President Roosewlt, Wiiam Green, Norman Thomas, and
a host of others, there can be no neutrality for the
. 'United States in the war that the fascists are now so
busily preparing. The whole world will be drawn into
the slaughter if and when it comes. The only way America can keep out of war is by keeping war out of the
world. At all costs, the American workers must help
stop the approaching war by supporting the policy of
collective security against the fascist aggressors. We
must give active aid to the brave Spanish workers and
peasants who are now struggling heroically against, the
fascist butchers; we must support militantly the peace
program of the Soviet Union; we must re-affiliate the
American trade unions to the Amsterdam Trade Union
International we must connect up o w own forces with
the anti-fascist fighters for peace in every country. And
all these measures must.& backed up by a powerful
united front peace movement in this coirtltry, consisting
of trade mions, farmersJ organizations, professionals'
associations, youth organizations, peace societies, women's dubs, religious bodies, local Farmer-Labor ~aities,
Socialist Party, Communist Party, etc As a mass progressive f ~ r c ethe C.I.O. has the responsible task to
draw the great body of trade unionist; into this vita1
struggle for peace.

,

3Roleof the C.I.O.

I

The C.I.O., led so aggressively by John L. Lewis,
is doing a historically important thing in carrying on its
vigorous campaiign to organize the armies o f exploited
workers in the mass production industries. As we have
seen, this campaign has within it possibilities for a fundamental strengthening and reorganization.of the whole
American labor movement. Thus the C.I.O. has become the actual leader of the trade union movement.
The Executive Council of the A. F. of L. has shown
itself opposed to this vital organization work and because of its narrow craft union and p e m d interests
has refused for many years past to do the organizing
: that the C.I.O. is now undertaking. Had it so desired,
the A. F. of L. could have easily organized the steel
worksrs during the war, or during the Coolidge period
of prosperity, or during the strike upheavals under the
N.R.A. in 1933-1934. But the A. F. of L. wanted
nothing to do with the organization of the steel workers.
And worse yet, now that the C.I.O. unions, which are
awake to the basic importance of this task to themselves
and to all other workers, are proceeding to accomplish
the organizing work that the Executive Council has so
long neglected or prevented, the Executive Council
actually suspends them, one-third of the whole Iabr
movement, from the A. F. of L., and thus traitorously
splits labor's forces in the face of the enemy. Never,
even in the shady history of the A. F. of L., has rnisleadership sunk to lower levels. The A. F. of L. Executive council has surrendered the true leadership of the
trade unions into the hands of the C.I.O.
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The Communist Party heartily supports the C.I.O.
organizing campaigns in the steel, automobile, rubber,
glass, textile, oil, etc., industries, and it mobilizes all its
forces to assist in this work. I t extends this aid for the
same reason that it supp,orts every forward movement
of the workers-wherever it may originate or what form.
it may take, whether it be a strike, an organization campaign, the carrying on of independent working dass political activity, or what not. The Communist Party has
no interests apart from those of the working dass, and
every victory of the workers is a victory for the Communist Party. But in supporting the C.1 .O.'s organizing
work the Communist Party does not fail to point out
constructively and in a friendly spirit whatever it may
consider to be-weaknesses in that work, such as the inT
s a a e n t mobilization of the progressives in the craft
unions to support the C.1.0.'~ position, hesitancy in
using more aggressive methods of mass organization
. work, underestimation of trade union democracy, failure
to raise the question of industrial unionism regarding
the craft unions themselves and insdicient orientation
towards the formation of a national Farmer-Labor
Party. Also the Communist Party, with its revolutionary program, looks far beyond the perspective of the
C.I.O. I t aims at the abolition of the capitalist system
and the complete liquidation of the exploitation of man
by man through the private ownership of industry and
the land, by the establishment of socialism.
The C.I.O. has done very good work up to dace, but
its biggest tasks still remain ahead. There is to be .
accomplished not only the successful completion of the
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organization drives in steel, auto, etc., but also, as I
have pointed out, the broad tasks of consolidating the
victory; th;Lt is, of realizing the fuu economic and
: political possibilities of the C.I.O. movement, including
the extension of the organization work far and wide in
: industry generally; the re-establishment of a unified
and democratized A. F. of L. based on industrial
unionism and a dass struggle policy and with a progressive leadership; the, foundation of a great united
front Farmer-Labor Party as the beginning of an
American People's Front; the building up of a broad
peace m.ovement, etc. These tasks confronting the
: C.I.O. amount, in sum, to a veritable renaissance of the
whole American trade union movement.
John L. Lewis and other C.I.O. leaders, although
having a very conservative background, have shown a
real spirit of progress in the development of the C.I.O.
movement. Their progressive advan& was a most extraordinary development to take place in the ranks of
the reactionary A. F. of L. trade union leadership. And
to accomplish the historic tasks of the great forward
development of whifh they stand at the head, new tests
will be made of their responsiveness to the masses'
needs. To realize in full the implications and possibilities
of the situation they will have to display the broadest
vision and livest progressivism. They have in, their
hands the opportunity to do a most fundamental service
to theworking class, not only of America, but of the
whole world.
New Ymk, Jamary, 1937
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